Public health and service delivery programmes, interventions and policies (collectively, ‘programmes’) are typically developed and implemented for the primary purpose of effecting change rather than generating knowledge. Nonetheless, evaluations of these programmes may produce valuable learning that helps determine effectiveness and costs as well as informing design and implementation of future programmes. Such studies might be termed ‘opportunistic evaluations’, since they are responsive to emergent opportunities rather than being studies of interventions that are initiated or designed by researchers. However, current (...) ethical guidance and registration procedures make little allowance for scenarios where researchers have played no role in the development or implementation of a programme, but nevertheless plan to conduct a prospective evaluation. We explore the limitations of the guidance and procedures with respect to opportunistic evaluations, providing a number of examples. We propose that one key missing distinction in current guidance is moral responsibility: researchers can only be held accountable for those aspects of a study over which they have control. We argue that requiring researchers to justify an intervention, programme or policy that would occur regardless of their involvement prevents or hinders research in the public interest without providing any further protections to research participants. We recommend that trial consent and ethics procedures allow for a clear separation of responsibilities for the intervention and the evaluation. (shrink)

In this chapter, I approach the anticipatory character of experience and the possibility of focusing on the present from the viewpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. I do this by analyzing in particular the emotional dimension of expectations. In the framework of Husserlian phenomenology, the concept of emotional expectation describes a subject´s orientation toward what is coming as an affective tension, that is, an emotional way of “being tensed” toward the future. The general aim of the chapter is thus to explore the (...) possible contributions of Husserl´s analyses of the relation between different temporal phases of consciousness to the debate in the context of mindfulness about the possibility of focusing on the now moment and observing and regulating emotions. First, I will present the concept of emotional expectation and the anticipatory dimension of time-consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology. This requires clarifying the specific emotional character of expectations, that is, explaining how expectations are to be understood in the emotional sphere, in terms of how they both differ from and intertwine with intellectual expectations. Second, I will provide an overview of the sedimentation of feelings in emotional dispositions and of the “resonance” of feelings. Finally, I will refer to the role of attention in redirecting consciousness to the now, and in the observation of emotions. In this regard, I will argue that, even though every experience involves past, present, and future temporal modes, attention can favor what is given in the now and can intervene in order to observe emotions as they are going on. In general terms, I will try to describe the passive genesis of disposition that predelineates present experience and expectations regarding the future, and also to explore the possibility of actively intervening from the present to reconfigure this passive predelineation. (shrink)

Speakers of English have available a set of terms dedicated to doing individual self-reference: `I' and its grammatical variants, `me', `my', `mine', etc. Speaker selection of other than these dedicated terms may invite special attention for what has prompted their use. This article draws on field recordings of talk-in-interaction in which speakers use `third-person' reference forms when speaking about themselves. We show that third-person forms are recurrently used for representing the views of someone else. We also show how — by (...) drawing on resources such as the distinction between recognitional and non-recognitional person reference forms, and on category bound attributes — the particular third-person term selected can be fitted to and thereby contribute to the action a speaker is implementing through their turn at talk. (shrink)

En una primera parte presentamos una lectura de la Ilustración guiada por el interés de identificar, entre las distintas concepciones de la razón que se despliegan en ella, la que presenta mayores virtualidades emancipatorias para el feminismo. El punto de partida es un análisis del planteamiento de Hume de la identidad personal que pone en evidencia sus sesgos patriarcales. Se contrapone la noción humeana de una razón inerte con la deriva que, a partir del cartesianismo, lleva a Poullain de la (...) Barre a concebir la razón como un trabajo o un esfuerzo permanentes. Se relaciona la aportación de este filósofo feminista epígono del cartesianismo con el «conatus» spinoziano para enlazar, por último, con la idea de Mary Wollstonecraft de la razón como «razón meritoria»: carece de privilegios adscriptivos en la retícula de fuerzas en las que opera junto con las pasiones a la vez que se inviste con un valor emergente crítico del Ancien Régime. En la segunda parte, se defiende que los procesos crítico-reflexivos que ponen en cuestión la legitimidad de las instituciones vigentes en una cultura no son monopolio de Occidente. En este sentido, la Ilustración no es su patrimonio exclusivo en la medida en que podemos encontrar en otras culturas «vetas de Ilustración». A título de aval de esta hipótesis se reconstruye la obra del filósofo magrebí Al-Yabri, autor de la Crítica de la Razón árabe como paradigmática de lo que puede ser una apropiación selectiva del propio pasado en función de «las interpelaciones interculturales» del presente. A la luz de la misma, se recupera a Averroes como un clásico de una «modernidad planetaria» que apuesta por el laicismo y de la que se desprenden implicaciones para el feminismo. (shrink)

W. V. Quine famously claimed that no statement is immune to revision. This thesis has had a profound impact on twentieth century philosophy, and it still occupies centre stage in many contemporary debates. However, despite its importance it is not clear how it should be interpreted. I show that the thesis is in fact ambiguous between three substantially different theses. I illustrate the importance of clarifying it by assessing its use in the debate against the existence of a priori knowledge. (...) I show how the three different readings of the thesis can be used to generate three substantially different and philosophically significant arguments against the a priori. I further challenge each one of these arguments against the a priori. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore this idea of a collective consciousness. I propose that individuals can share in a collective consciousness by forming a collective subject. I begin the essay by considering and rejecting three possible pictures of collective subjectivity: the group mind, the emergent mind, and the socially embedded mind. I argue that each of these accounts fails to provide one of the following requirements for collective subjectivity: (1) plurality, (2) awareness, and (3) collectivity. I then look to Edmund (...) Husserl’s idea of ‘social subjectivities’ for a possible account, but I agree with Alfred Schutz that Husserl fails to explain how such subjectivities are constituted by the conscious acts of individuals. In an effort to provide such an explanation, I turn to a discussion of our basic capacities for social intentionality: empathy, intersubjectivity, and co-subjectivity. In the final section of the essay, I argue that individuals can form a collective subject by taking a first-person plural perspective and ‘simulating’ the consciousness of the collective that they form. This account has the required features of plurality, awareness, and collectivity. (shrink)

Phosphatidylinositol 3‐phosphate (PtdIns3P) is generated on the cytosolic leaflet of cellular membranes, primarily by phosphorylation of phosphatidylinositol by class II and class III phosphatidylinositol 3‐kinases. The bulk of this lipid is found on the limiting and intraluminal membranes of endosomes, but it can also be detected in domains of phagosomes, autophagosome precursors, cytokinetic bridges, the plasma membrane and the nucleus. PtdIns3P controls cellular functions through recruitment of specific protein effectors, many of which contain FYVE or PX domains. Cellular processes known (...) to be controlled by PtdIns3P and its effectors include endosomal fusion, sorting and motility, autophagy, cytokinesis, regulated exocytosis and signal transduction. Here we discuss how Ptdins3P is generated on specific cellular membranes, how its localizations and functions can be studied, and how its effectors serve to control cellular functions.Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssays:Phosphatidylinositol 4,5‐bisphosphate: Targeted production and signalingAbstractHow does SHIP1/2 balance PtdIns(3,4)P2 and does it signal independently of its phosphatase activity?AbstractPhosphatidylinositol‐3,4,5‐trisphosphate: Tool of choice for class I PI 3‐kinasesAbstractPhosphatidylinositol‐4‐phosphate: The Golgi and beyondAbstract. (shrink)

In this paper we present an equivalence between the category of commutative regular rings and the category of Boolean-valued fields, i.e., Boolean-valued sets for which the field axioms are true. The author used this equivalence in [12] to develop a Galois theory for commutative regular rings. Here we apply the equivalence to give an alternative construction of an algebraic closure for any commutative regular ring.Boolean-valued sets were developed in 1965 by Scott and Solovay [10] to simplify independence proofs in set (...) theory. They later were applied by Takeuti [13] to obtain results on Hilbert and Banach spaces. Ellentuck [3] and Weispfenning [14] considered Boolean-valued rings which consisted of rings and associated Boolean-valued relations. To the author's knowledge, the present work is the first to employ the Boolean-valued sets of Scott and Solovay to obtain results in algebra.The idea that commutative regular rings can be studied by examining the properties of related fields is not new. For several years algebraists and logicians have investigated commutative regular rings by representing a commutative regular ring as a subdirect product of fields or as the ring of global sections of a sheaf of fields over a Boolean space. These representations depend, as does the work presented here, on the fact that the set of central idempotents of any ring with identity forms a Boolean algebra. The advantage of the Boolean-valued set approach is that the axioms of classical logic and set theory are true in the Boolean universe. Therefore, if the axioms for a field are true for a Boolean-valued set, then other properties of the set can be deduced immediately from field theory. (shrink)

There has been some degree of scepticism regarding the intelligibility of the notion of truth in virtue of meaning – which has come to be known as metaphysical notion of analyticity – ever since W. V. Quine’s famous attack. Such scepticism has been forcefully reinforced by Paul Boghossian, and more recently by Timothy Williamson. My main aim is to defend this sceptical stance. I argue that, understood literally, we are right to repudiate this notion of analyticity. But understood less literally, (...) we might find it less objectionable. Drawing from two-dimensional approaches to semantics, I offer what could be a new way of understanding the metaphysical notion of analyticity, one that does not suffer from the problems associated with the old notion of metaphysical analyticity. I argue that despite its intelligibility, this new notion does not seem to capture a semantic phenomenon deserving of the name ‘analytic’ or if it does it fails to capture the kind of semantic phenomenon necessary for the empiricist account of the a priori. (shrink)

This paper responds to Maria Wowk’s (Human Studies, 30, 131–155, 2007) critique of “Kitzinger’s feminist conversation analysis”, corrects her misrepresentation of it, and rebuts her claim to have cast doubt on whether it is “genuinely identifiable” as conversation analysis (CA). More broadly, it uses Wowk’s critique as a springboard for continuing the development of feminist conversation analysis through: (i) discussion of appropriate methods of data collection and analysis; (ii) clarification of CA’s turn-taking model and an illustrative deployment of it in (...) the analysis of a single case and of a collection (of if/then compound TCUs); (iii) exposition of a feminist CA understanding of “participants’ orientations”, and of the relevance of the distinction between participants’ and analysts’ orientations for feminist work. Finally, I suggest that feminist work in CA makes important contributions to the development of CA as a discipline. (shrink)

Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features (...) of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's infl uential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is intended to stimulate debate amongst stakeholders in the international research community on the topic of returning individual genetic research results to study participants. Pharmacogenetics and disease genetics studies are becoming increasingly prevalent, leading to a growing body of information on genetic associations for drug responsiveness and disease susceptibility with the potential to improve health care. Much of these data are presently characterized as exploratory (non‐validated or hypothesis‐generating). There is, however, a trend for research participants to be (...) permitted access to their personal data if they so choose. Researchers, sponsors, patient advocacy groups, ethics committees and regulatory authorities are consequently confronting the issue of whether, and how, study participants might receive their individual results. Noted international ethico‐legal guidelines and public policy positions in Europe and the United States are reviewed for background. The authors offer ‘Points‐to‐Consider’ regarding returning research results in the context of drug development trials based on their knowledge and experience. These considerations include: the clinical relevance of data, laboratory qualifications, informed consent procedures, confidentiality of medical information and the competency of persons providing results to participants. The discussion is framed as a benefit‐to‐risk assessment to balance the potential positive versus negative consequences to participants, while maintaining the integrity and feasibility of conducting genetic research studies. (shrink)

Environmentalists often argue that, in order to address fundamentally the harmful impact of their activities on the environment, western industrial societies need to change their attitude to nature. Specifically, they need to see nature as sacred, and to acknowledge that humanity is a part of nature rather than separate from it. In this paper, I seek to show that these tow ideas are incompatible in the context of western culture. Drawing particularly on ideas expressed by western conservationists, I argue that (...) nature is already seen as sacred, and that its sacredness depends on it being seen as separate from humanity, an idea which effectively contradicts the scientific knowledge on which many conservationists base their actions. Goodin's green theory of value is used as a source of ideas about why non-human nature is experienced as sacred, and can be extended to suggest that other values, such as 'development' and progress', are also seen as sacred. (shrink)

This article briefly considers the convergence and divergence between Discursive Psychology and Conversation Analysis, in relation to cognition in talk-in-interaction. It explores the possibilities for research that begins from, rather than argues for, a post-cognitive perspective. Drawing in particular on an analysis of a single fragment of conversation, I suggest three analytic areas for researchers concerned both with talk-in-interaction and with cognition: i) the social organization of cognitive displays and embodiments; ii) the production of taken-for-granted culture through ‘internalized social norms’; (...) iii) cognitions made manifest in interaction, as the cognitive infrastructure upon which talk-in-interaction depends. After post-cognitivism, research in these areas can contribute both to scholarly understanding of cognition, and to the emerging discipline of CA. (shrink)

Avicenna's proof for the existence of God (the Necessary Existent) in the Metaphysics of the Salvation relies on the claim that every possible existent shares a common cause. I argue that Avicenna has good reason to hold this claim given that he thinks that (1) every essentially ordered causal series originates in a first, common cause and that (2) every possible existent belongs to an essentially ordered series. Showing Avicenna's commitment to 1 and 2 allows me to respond to Herbert (...) Davidson's and Richard Swinburne's claim that Avicenna's proof for the Necessary Existent is incomplete and fallacious -/- . (shrink)

Los intentos de Husserl por elaborar una ética formal análoga a la lógica culminan con la formulación de una ley formal superior de la práctica, i.e., el imperativo categórico, considerado por él como el problema central de la ética. Tal formulación se presenta como el núcleo de un sistema ético que pretende, en su nivel más fundamental, determinar las leyes formales de la acción correcta. En este marco, el objetivo del artículo es intentar determinar el significado preciso, la función y (...) el alcance de la apropiación husserliana del imperativo categórico, y su relación con el sistema que constituye su referente fundamental en la elaboración de una ética formal: la ética kantiana. (shrink)

feminist scholars studying gender in the Pacific have analyzed the conditions of Pacific Islander women with an acute analysis on how the intersections of gender, culture, colonization, and strategies of decolonization aid in framing the experiences of Pacific Islander women. Like many introduced Western institutions in Hawai'i, medical practices in hospitals and clinics have been both criticized and welcomed among Pacific Islanders. Feminist anthropologists Vicki Lukere and Margaret Jolly have diagnosed these conflicting receptions to medical institutions in the Pacific Islands (...) as a reliance on a problematic binary of "modern" and "traditional" medical care. According to Lukere and Jolly, the... (shrink)

This brief meditation on Maggie Nelson's The Argonauts reads it as elaborating a politics and ethics of vulnerability in both its thinking and its formal qualities, thereby showing us the radical aesthetic, personal and political potential of this state of apparent unguardedness. I consider, in turn, the text's treatment of emotional vulnerability, physical vulnerability, the vulnerability of gender and our vulnerability to gender, as well as the vulnerabilities of the apparently confessional writer and of the text itself.

I teach a workshop on mending and repair at a local haberdashery shop called RayStitch in North London, and I usually begin each session by describing how my interest started. It was because of a sweater that was all worn out and full of holes, with thin and threadbare knitting in its forearms. It had already been repaired in several places, and that repair was visible. The thick white sweater had belonged to my great-uncle Roland and had been mended over (...) the years by his sister, my great-aunt Elizabeth. My great-uncle was a painter, and in old age he used to sit with a board across the arms of his chair and lean forward drawing on paper taped to the board.Roly and Elizabeth.The sleeves on Roly's sweater... (shrink)

Segundo um influente argumento contra a existência de conhecimento a priori, não há conhecimento a priori porque (i) nenhuma crença é imune à revisão, e (ii) se houvesse conhecimento a priori, algumas crenças seriam irrevisíveis. Uma versão deste argumento foi celebremente defendida por W. V. Quine e ainda é popular entre filósofos naturalistas. O objectivo deste artigo é examinar e rejeitar este argumento contra o a priori. O artigo começa por discutir a tese (i) e o seu papel no modelo (...) da Teia de Crenças de Quine. Defende-se que (i) enfrenta importantes desafios que colocam em risco o seu uso no argumento supra. A premissa (ii) do argumento é então discutida. Philip Kitcher é conhecido pela sua defesa de uma versão da premissa (ii). Os seus argumentos são analisados e rejeitados. A conclusão é que não temos uma boa razão para aceitar (ii), e consequentemente este argumento contra o a priori. O artigo termina com a proposta de uma caracterização do a priori perfeitamente compatível com (i). (shrink)

Intuition-based accounts of the a priori are criticised for appealing to a “mysterious” faculty of rational intuition to explain how a priori knowledge is possible. Analyticity-based accounts are typically motivated by opposition to them, offering a purportedly “non-mysterious” account of the a priori. In this paper, I argue that analyticity-based accounts are in no better position to explain the a priori than intuition-based accounts, and that we have good reason to doubt the explanation they offer. To do this, I focus (...) on recent analyticity-based accounts of the a priori, which appeal to understanding alone to explain the a priori. First, I argue that the appeal to understanding as the source of the a priori is no less mysterious than the appeal to rational intuition. Second, I argue that analyticity-based accounts of the a priori do not provide an alternative to intuition-based accounts as the fundamental explanation they offer of the a priori is one that could equally be endorsed by a friend of rational intuition—and that they fail for reasons that do not undermine intuition-based accounts. (shrink)

It is nowadays standard to distinguish between epistemic and metaphysical analyticity. Metaphysical analyticity has been widely rejected, while epistemic analyticity has been widely endorsed. I argue that we also have good reason to reject epistemic analyticity. I do so by considering all the plausible ways of characterizing epistemic analyticity and of drawing the epistemic analytic–synthetic distinction. I argue that on all of them, the distinction fails to carve at the semantic joints. I conclude that there is good reason to think (...) that there is no semantic distinction to be drawn between analytic and synthetic sentences. (shrink)

I defend Spinoza's claim that extension is an attribute that an indivisible substance, such as God, could have. However, in order to explain why, we must abandon two long held orthodoxies in Spinoza scholarship. First, Spinoza acknowledges only parts that do not depend on their whole. Second, God, considered as natura naturans, has no parts of any kind. Against these orthodoxies, I show that having parts which depend on their whole, for Spinoza, does not entail divisibility and that God, considered (...) as natura naturans, must have such parts in order to be extended. Along the way, we will have a closer look at Spinoza’s mereology and address apparently conflicting statements that Spinoza makes about the relation of part and whole that have long vexed commentators. (shrink)

This essay presents Mendelssohn’s neglected vindication of theism through a refutation of Spinoza’s philosophy in the Morgenstunden and highlights its relevance for discussions in contemporary philosophy of religion. For this purpose, I (i) contextualise Mendelssohn's argument within the reception of Spinoza at the dawn of the 18th century, (ii) trace the path of Mendelssohn's argument to theism, (iii) and examine Mendelssohn's argument in light of Linda Zagzebski's account of divine omniscience showing that her account is not only incoherent but also (...) undermines the theistic assumption that the world has an existence outside of God. (shrink)

Researchers studying at-risk and socially disenfranchised child and adolescent populations are facing ethical dilemmas not previously encountered in the laboratory or the clinic. One such set of ethical challenges involves whether to: (a) share with guardians research derived information regarding participant risk, (b) provide participants with service referrals, or (c) report to local authorities problems uncovered during the course of investigation. The articles assembled for this special section address the complex issues of deciding if, when, and how to report or (...) provide referrals for research participants who are minors (referred to hereafter as minor research participants). This paper focuses on two factors underlying these decisions: the validity of risk estimates and meta-ethical positions on scientific responsibility. It is suggested that, before sharing information about minor research participants investigators should do the following: critically examine the diagnostic validity of developmental measures, include the scope and limitations of information sharing in informed consent procedures, and become familiar with state reporting laws. I discuss the impact of the traditionally accepted act utilitarian meta-ethical position on the investigator-participant relationship, and I recommend consideration of alternative positions as a step toward developing a research ethic of scientific responsibility and care. (shrink)

In the _Sententia cum questionibus in libros De anima I-II Aristotelis _, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, the recovered Aristotelian understanding of the soul does not completely replace the old Neoplatonic frame. Indeed, the commentary holds the existence of self-knowledge from the very beginning of the existence of the soul, before the acquisition of species. The aim of this paper is to describe _Sententia_’s view on self-knowledge analysing it in the context of its eclectic psychology and epistemology. I will attempt to (...) demonstrate that, although the commentary is set in an explicit Neoplatonic framework, Petrus Hispanus seems to be quite uncomfortable within this framework and becomes increasingly committed to the Aristotelian doctrine and its vision of science. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: “I started when there was no such thing as traditional” “Simple is Good”:10 An Affirmation of Authenticity Notes.

The challenges posed by postmodern and poststructural theories profoundly disrupt the certainties of feminist and nursing research, yet at the same time offer possibilities for developing new epistemologies. While there are an increasing number of accounts discussing the theoretical implications of these ideas for nursing research, I wish to discuss the practical and the methodological implications of using postmodern feminist theories within empirical research. In particular, I identify the challenges I encountered through an examination of specific aspects of the research (...) process and through examples drawn from empirical research. I conclude that using postmodern feminist theories requires a continuous engagement with, and interrogation of, the modern epistemological and ontological assumptions of qualitative, feminist nursing research and, in so doing, presents the possibility for nurse scholars to begin to develop a ‘passionately interested’ methodological approach to nursing inquiry. (shrink)

Retinoic acid (RA), a derivative of vitamin A, is essential for normal mammalian development. Developmental abnormalities induced by RA excess and vitamin A deficiency are different even though they affect the same organ systems, and it is clear that there are intraembryonic tissue differences in the requirement for RA. The developmental functions of RA are mediated by its effects on gene expression. In the nucleus, two different forms of RA bind to and activate two families of nuclear receptors, which themselves (...) co‐operate in initiating the transcription of target genes. In this article I propose that the amount of RA reaching the nucleus in different embryonic tissues is modulated by a mechanism involving three cytoplasmic binding proteins for retinol (CRBP I) and retinoic acid (CRABP I and II). Abnormalities of craniofacial development resulting from exposure of early neural plate stage embryos to RA excess have been studied in some detail; their initial stages involve alteration of both morphological development and the segment‐specific pattern of gene expression in the early hindbrain and its derived neural crest. This system is ideal for studying the relationships between retinoic acid receptors, retinoid binding proteins, and the development of genetic and morphological pattern. (shrink)

According to Ron Mallon (2004), any adequate account of race must meet three constraints: passing, no-traveling, and reality. "Passing" describes the fact that persons who are treated by others as belonging to one race, may "actually" belong to a different race. "No traveling" refers to the fact that racial concepts such as "white" may pick out different sets of persons in different cultures. "Reality" refers to the fact that racial designations enter into explanations of how people's lives go. However, Mallon (...) argues that no account can simultaneously satisfy all three constraints. I argue that an account of race as an institutional fact, based on Searle's theory of constitutive rules, can satisfy all three constraints. Furthermore, the institutional account provides an enlightening explanation of these three features of race. (shrink)

Though we should probably find it easier to detect immorality in its instances than to determine morality in its essence, we generally take it for granted that to be moral is to be good. On the assumption, I suppose, that morality and goodness are actually equivalent, some have even said that it is goodness alone that is good. And yet in the name of morality men have suppressed their vitality, stifled their generosity, surrendered their reason, and gone like sheep to (...) the slaughter. In the name of morality men have distorted the truth and tormented the innocent. They have cut off heads in the past and they cut off heads in the present. It seems to me that alike with morality and without it, alike without it and with it, human behaviour may display brutality and insanity. Our human society may disintegrate and wither because of moral vacillation and paralysis. But it may be blighted the world over because struck by the lightning of moral frenzy. (shrink)

The recent “turn to matter” evident in material feminist theories of the more‐than‐human world offers distinct posthuman understandings of the world as continuously relationally entangled, emergent or materializing. In this paper, I consider how these premises both trouble conventional understandings of matter and/or materials, but likewise potentially revise and revitalize understandings of the political for health and inequalities, and for nursing. This is both timely and much needed given contemporary contexts of austerity‐driven neoliberalism in health care and the unprecedented growth (...) in disparities of wealth and well‐being. I wish to explore whether material feminisms allow us to retheorize connections between abstract theory and material concerns like health and inequalities, differently. This is not theory in opposition to practice or activism, but theory conceptualized as sets of entangled emergent practices, but also what constitutes the political, as more fully relational to and in praxis with health‐related activism. I will argue these theories further justify how practitioners can visibly care for and care more about social and health inequalities. Drawing mainly on the work of material feminist, Karen Barad, and her bringing together of queer and feminist theory, as well as feminist new materialisms and understandings of posthumanism, I discuss how this turn to matter together with meaning might transform understandings of health and inequalities. (shrink)

Using the concepts of epistemic virtue and vice as defined by José Medina, and reciprocal recognition as outlined by Glen Coulthard, I argue that the Canadian state is currently in a non-reciprocal relationship with Indigenous peoples as a result of epistemic failure on the part of the state. This failure involves a surfacelevel recognition of Indigenous peoples at the same time as the manifestation of the epistemic vices of arrogance, laziness and closed-mindedness. The epistemic injustice framework alongside a critique of (...) the politics of recognition can help shed light on what is going wrong betweenthe settler state and Indigenous peoples. Moreover, by appealing to grounded normativity, an Indigenous ethical framework, I argue that a land-based ethics of reciprocity can help us move toward reciprocal recognition and equality, if we are epistemically humble, curious and open-minded to it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 376-379 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Cervantes, the Novel, and the New World Cervantes, the Novel, and the New World, by Diana de Armas Wilson; 254 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, $74.00. In Cervantes, the Novel, and the New World, Diana de Armas Wilson describes and analyzes the link between the birth of the New World in European consciousness and the expression (...) of that consciousness in the novels of Cervantes. Those of us whose teaching includes works from both Peninsular and Spanish American literature have long felt the need for a study that goes beyond a cataloging of Cervantes's references to the world beyond Europe, and those Cervantine scholars among us have variously hinted at and side-stepped the fullness of this issue. As it was with those exemplary figures of the age of exploration she examines, it is to Professor de Armas Wilson's great credit that she has risen to the challenge. Her analysis is well-organized, reasoned, thoughtful, and readable.De Armas Wilson's knowledge of previous and current research in Cervantine studies as well as genre, colonial and postcolonial, and gender studies is impressive. She also admits to participating "in the kinds of critique currently associated with cultural studies, although not without reservations regarding the alleged presentism of that discipline or its tendency to turn primary texts into commodities." I would respond that de Armas Wilson's concerns and techniques in this study are precisely the tools we need to help us define "cultural studies" to our students and to ourselves as scholars of various literatures and cultures.To begin her study, de Armas Wilson mentions many of Cervantes's literary and personal references to geographies, customs, and other contacts with the [End Page 376] world outside Spain. The first chapter, "The Americanist Cervantes," focuses on that material and includes a brief review of recent research--the latest "grande escrutinario" (Don Quijote, Part I, Chapter VI)--regarding what works might have been in Cervantes's library and/or the texts potentially available to him. Professor de Armas Wilson looks at Cervantes's references and the texts available to him through three lenses: imitation, influence, and intertextuality. She sees these methodologies as interdependent and argues that: "the intertextual practices in this book--based on a revised concept of intertextuality that includes the notion of agency and participates in a historical project--are as American as its central topic." (Finding myself in the process of completing this review on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, I can only wonder what texts will not be influenced by the "historical project" of this day.)In the second chapter, "The Novel about the Novel," de Armas Wilson surveys Cervantes's status in Continental and Anglo-American criticism, reminding her readers of the polemic between scholars of the ancient novel and those who, bent on refusing to accept the Greco-Roman works as novels, designate them "romances." De Armas Wilson's contention that the Persiles is a "long exemplary novel," is convincingly depicted. Her arguments are based on the fact of the fictional time of the Persiles being within fifty years of the time when Cervantes wrote it, "its self-conscious theorizing, its rationalizing of 'miracles,' and its avowed imitation of Heliodorus' Aethiopica." She is not alone in arguing that Heliodorus' novel is the antithesis of a romance of chivalry. On these bases de Armas Wilson speaks not only to those who may not have recognized the importance of the Persiles because it has been called a romance (an often "despised or despicable" genre), but also to those of us who view consideration of the Persiles essential to an understanding of Don Quijote, if not a key to comprehending the major goals of all of Cervantes's works and his expression of the consciousness of his day.De Armas Wilson continues by arguing for "coevolutionary histories of the novel as alternatives to evolutionary ones." She bases her argument on echoes of widely disseminated accounts of happenings in the New World, (most significantly those of... (shrink)

Solomon’s article and Binmore’s response exemplify a standard exchange between the game theorist and those critical of applying game theory to ethics. The critic of game theory lists a number of problems with game theory and the game theorist responds by arguing that the critic’s objections are based on a misrepresentation of the theory. Binmore claims that the game theorist is in the position of the innocent man who, when asked why he beats his wife, must explain that he doesn’t (...) beat his wife at all (Binmore, 2). However, even if we agree that the denial is true, we might still like to know why, if you are not beating your wife, do others consistently accuse you of doing so? Or, to get away from this rather sexist metaphor, why are critics of game theory like Solomon (according to game theorists) consistently getting game theory wrong?While, as I argue in the first section, critics of game theory such as Solomon may misrepresent game theory, this misrepresentation is not entirely their own fault. The way in which game theory is traditionally presented is misleading. For example, students are usually first introduced to game theory through the prisoner’s dilemma. It is compelling drama, but lousy PR for the use of ethics in game theory. (You want to know what to do? Let’s see how two thieves reason.) However, while Binmore is right to argue that game theory neither assumes nor entails the theory of human nature that Solomon finds objectionable, Solomon is also right to argue that game theory is promulgated and applied with what appear to be a robust set of assumptions about human motivation. I argue in the second section, however, that in fact neither these applications of game theory, nor game theory itself, is committed to a particular theory of human motivation. Thus, while game theory is not able to provide a complete ethical theory (assuming that a theory of human motivation is essential to such a theory), it is not contrary to ethics. In the final section I note that Aristotle, rather than being the alternative to using game theory in business ethics, as Solomon suggests, actually points the way to an ethical theory that can combine a discussion of both game theory and “those nagging and controversial questions about what it is that people do and ought to care about” (Solomon, 7). (shrink)

Human rights are those legal and/or moral rights that all persons have simply as persons. In the current digital age, human rights are increasingly being either fulfilled or violated in the online environment. In this article, I provide a way of conceptualizing the relationships between human rights and information technology. I do so by pointing out a number of misunderstandings of human rights evident in Vinton Cerf's recent argument that there is no human right to the Internet. I claim that (...) Cerf fails to recognize the existence of derived human rights. I argue further that we need to consider what other human rights are necessitated by the digital age. I suggest we need a Declaration of Digital Rights. As a step toward the development of such a declaration, I suggest a framework for thinking through how to ensure the human rights are satisfied in digital contexts. (shrink)

In his paper “The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality,” Sanford Goldberg argues that relying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs “socially diffuse” and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant may be socially diffuse (because it depends on the warrants of other epistemic agents) this feature has no special link to our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Nevertheless, I (...) endorse Goldberg’s claim about rationality and I propose that a Foley-style account of rationality might help to better articulate Goldberg’s proposal. (shrink)

In their mangled versions of this poem Baehrens and Housman have both anticipated the first of these changes whilst lines 19–20 are placed as I suggest by Housman and Postgate and lines 21–4 are placed before line 39 by Scaliger, Housman, Butler, and others. Nevertheless I recall these transpositions here, primarily because my third change is intelligible only through them, but also because their correctness has been generally neglected amid the confusing assortment of wholly unnecessary transpositions that this poem has (...) suffered. My reasons for recommending the above changes are these. (shrink)

According to the most popular account of the a priori, which we might call Analytic Account of the A Priori, we can explain the a priori in terms of the notion of analyticity. According to the least popular account of the a priori, the explanation of the a priori proceeds by appealing to the faculties used in the acquisition of a priori knowledge, such as the faculty of rational intuition – call this Rationalist Account of the A Priori. The main (...) aim of this paper is to challenge the analytic account of the a priori to motivate a return to rationalism. To achieve this aim, I discuss and challenge two very different analytic accounts of the a priori: a concept-based account that relies on meaning-justification links, and an understanding-based account that does not rely on such links. I argue that the former is both extensionally inadequate and explanatorily deficient, and the latter can be made to work but only by employing such a rich notion of understanding that renders it a form of rationalism in disguise. I conclude by motivating a rationalist faculty-based account of the a priori. (shrink)

It has been recommended that parents should monitor their children’s Internet use, including what sites their children visit, what messages they receive, and what they post. In this paper, I claim that parents ought not to follow this advice, because to do so would violate children’s right to privacy over their on-line information exchanges. In defense of this claim, I argue that children have a right to privacy from their parents, because such a right respects their current capacities and fosters (...) their future capacities for autonomy and relationships. (shrink)

This paper employs a feminist model of scapegoating designed to capture the function that scapegoating plays in the justification and masking of oppression, and examines specific forms of legislation that target the rights of trans people to uncover their scapegoating patterns. Because scapegoating is experienced as a justified attribution of blame, it evades the understanding of those participating in its dynamics. My aim is to make apparent the transphobic rhetoric that convinces people of its necessity, such that we can determine (...) the best means to undermine its discriminatory consequences. I do this by examining the scapegoating logic behind bills that seek to impact various aspects of the lives of trans people, including education, sports, identification, and healthcare. (shrink)

Some brain injured patients are left in a permanent vegetative state, i.e., they have irreversibly lost their capacity for consciousness but retained some autonomic physiological functions, such as breathing unaided. Having discussed the controversial nature of the permanent vegetative state as a diagnostic category, we turn to the question of the patients’ ontological status. Are the permanently vegetative alive, dead, or in some other state? We present empirical data from interviews with relatives of patients, and with experts, to support the (...) view that the ontological state of permanently vegetative patients is unclear: such patients are neither straightforwardly alive nor simply dead. Having defended this view from counter-arguments we turn to the practical question as to how these patients ought to be treated. Some relatives and experts believe it is right for patients to be shifted from their currently unclear ontological state to that of being straightforwardly dead, but many are concerned or even horrified by the only legally sanctioned method guaranteed to achieve this, namely withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration. A way of addressing this distress would be to allow active euthanasia for these patients. This is highly controversial; but we argue that standard objections to allowing active euthanasia for this particular class of permanently vegetative patients are weakened by these patients’ distinctive ontological status. (shrink)